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This essay looks at the role of online platforms as rule-makers. The disruption of the 
Platform Economy has come hand in hand with a broader transformation: the 
emergence of a post-regulatory society, which feels more and more comfortable with 
transacting outside conventional legal and regulatory frameworks. This has raised the 
question as to how to regulate these platforms, if at all. This short piece focuses on how 
platform businesses are developing their own governance frameworks based on self-
regulation, trust, and reputation, which create incentives for online traders to comply 
with the platforms' terms and conditions. Due to reputational enforcement and 
network effects, platforms act as powerful gatekeepers of online markets, displaying 
features of governance through contract. By recommending the use of contract 
governance as an analytical framework, this essay proposes a research agenda to 
examine the extent to which these emerging governance frameworks act as a competing 
alternative to existing forms of State-provided market regulation.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Globalisation and digitisation have brought about the emergence of new 
technological, economic and social paradigms. Technological developments 
have prompted not only a socioeconomic revolution, they are also 
transforming the legal landscape, the existing legal categories, and even the 
current understanding of law. This essay focuses on one of the most central 
issues of the Digital Economy: the role of online platforms as rule-makers.  
The existing regulatory regimes struggle in responding to the challenges 
posed by online platforms. In the meantime, these platforms continue their 
development and are offering their own normative solutions. This has led to 
the (spontaneous) emergence of norms generated by the platforms 
themselves and, to a lesser extent, by their users' community. Platforms' 
governance frameworks are largely based on reputational mechanisms and 
trust. Self-regulation is a common feature of platform businesses. However, 
this essay puts the spotlight on the role of reputational mechanisms 
(feedback and ratings) as a source of normativity. The main hypothesis is that 
by providing feedback and rating the services they have used or the products 
that they have bought, platforms' businesses and users are 'spontaneously' 
generating new rules. This is particularly true in those cases where users' 
ratings are used as a benchmark when resolving a private dispute under a 
dispute settlement procedure embedded in the platform itself. Hence, the 
reputational system stands as a novel form of dealing with, and regulating, 
market failures and problems of asymmetric information outside any official 
law-making procedure. Such developments defy conventional regulatory 
theories and increase the appeal of digital platforms as an object of legal and 
interdisciplinary research. 
To date, the role and relevance of consumer feedback as a parameter for 
dispute resolution and its potential as one of the sources of the law of the 
platform remain, with some exceptions, a largely unexplored terrain, lacking 
distinctive and compelling research. In Europe, legal scholarship has mainly 
focused on policy responses. The dominant approach is that this new 
paradigm for private transactions calls for a reform of EU consumer and 
contract law to be capable of accommodating new triangular relationships on 
which platform transactions are based, in order to safeguard consumers' 
interests and to extend the liability to the platform's intermediary. Some 
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'cautious' approaches have proposed the use of non-legal categories and self-
regulation, but only in combination with regulation. However, these 
approaches are based on an insufficient understanding of the impact of users' 
ratings and their potential to develop into generally applicable rules.  
Rather than providing a complete picture, this essay serves as a provocation 
as well as a research agenda into the enquiry of whether this phenomenon is 
a consequence of the emergence of a post-regulatory society that is calling for 
a different kind of 'law'. The essay critically enquires if and how online 
platforms are creating a new non-legal form of (transnational) regulation and 
the extent to which it is functioning as a viable and competing alternative to 
existing State market regulation. In so doing, the paper focuses on the 
different implications of the self-regulation of digital platforms. The paper 
initially outlines how online platforms, using new forms of self-regulation, 
based on spontaneously emerged norms and practices, are providing a 
regulatory alternative to conventional regulation. It also illustrates how 
platform businesses are built on structures heavily relying on trust and 
reputation. Finally, the paper also discusses the role and weight of 
reputational enforcement in dispute-solving. In that way, it offers a new 
analytical framework for the legal analysis of the Platform Economy based on 
contract governance. The piece concludes by addressing the necessity to look 
into the institutional choices that have favoured the emergence and 
successful development of online platform businesses. 
II. DISRUPTING THE LAW  
The Platform Economy is characterised by the existence of a structure, the 
platform, which enables transactions by connecting two contracting parties, 
be it for the purchase of a good or the provision of a service. Accordingly, the 
platform serves as a meeting point that relies on external action to generate a 
product or service that it is complementary to the platform itself. Online 
platforms such as Airbnb, Uber or Amazon enlarge consumers' choice by 
matching sellers and buyers, service providers and service users, credit 
seekers and investors, landlords and tenants, and the list goes on. The main 
feature of these platforms is the presence of network effects; the higher the 
number of users, the more appealing the platform becomes. Nowadays, 
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online platforms, from many perspectives, resemble nation-states.1 Data 
shows that the combined value of the companies representing the Platform 
Economy is more than $4.3 trillion and that these companies employ directly 
1.3 million people.2 Facebook manages 1.5 billion users, a 'population' bigger 
than most countries. Alibaba's transactions amounted to $248 billion last 
year.3 Through their terms and conditions, which platforms' users – usually 
hastily – accept, these online platforms become the regulators of significant 
segments of the world's population and the economy. 
From a legal perspective, the Platform Economy is reshaping the way in 
which transactions have been understood so far, and therefore, its regulation 
poses a difficult challenge for lawmakers.4 Some of these regulatory 
challenges include most notably the distinction between peer and trader and 
how this entails different externalities related to jurisdiction problems, tax 
avoidance, labour law and consumer law infringements, as well as how 
services and goods traded through online platforms may represent a risk of 
non-compliance with health and safety standards. Aware of the dimensions 
and particularities of this industry, governments (national, regional and local) 
are extemporaneously creating and enforcing rules and regulations applicable 
to platform businesses and their participants. However, the existing legal 
regimes are still unable to provide one-stop regulatory solutions to these 
phenomena, and that is giving rise to the fragmentation of the regulatory 
digital space. Governments are aware of fragmentation in the regulation of 
the Platform Economy and, therefore, are trying to provide comprehensive 
regulatory frameworks. Yet, the approaches differ significantly. While some 
governments are relying on traditional regulatory approaches setting up the 
rules for the emerging industry, other, more liberal, approaches are 
                                                 
1 S. P. Choudary, M. W. Van Alstyne, and G. G. Parker, Platform Revolution: How 
Networked Markets Are Transforming the Economy-and how to make them work for you 
(WW Norton & Company 2016).  
2 The Center for Global Enterprise, 'Global Platform Survey', 2015.  
3 The Wall Street Journal, 'What is Alibaba? ' WSJ Project http://projects.wsj.com 
/alibaba/ accessed on 19 January 2017. Data from 2016.  
4 W. J. Maxwell and P. Thierry, 'Regulating Digital Platforms in Europe–A White 
Paper' https://ssrn.com/abstract=2584873 accessed 10 February 2017. See also V. 
Hatzopoulos and S. Roma, 'Caring for Sharing? The Collaborative Economy under 
EU Law', (2017) 54(1) CML Rev 81. 
2017} Regulation.com… 57 
 
advocating the self-regulation of the sector as a mechanism to attract and to 
facilitate the proliferation of innovative businesses. A protectionist 
approach, favoured by some, is to restrict or even to ban certain new services. 
Two prominent examples are the prohibition of renting entire apartments 
through Airbnb in Berlin or the banning of Uber services in Spain. 
Within the different regulatory solutions, one alternative, the 'analogue' 
solution, would be to extend the regulatory scope of existing rules and 
regulations to include the new transactions and players (e.g. extending 
existing consumer protection rules, devised for the offline world, to peer-to-
peer transactions). National judges are already facing these scope problems.5 
This analogue approach would entail the creation of sector-specific rules that 
take into account the particular features of contractual transactions in the 
Platform Economy and to set out a dedicated regulatory regime from the 
outset.6 Some countries are already preparing dedicated rules, such as the 
Italian proposal on the Sharing Economy.7 In addition to this, there are also 
local and regional regulatory initiatives.8 However, the inability of domestic 
initiatives to provide solutions to a borderless phenomenon requires 
transnational action.  
                                                 
5 See Cases C‑191/15 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Amazon EU Sàrl 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:612; C-434/15 Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi, nyr; C-526/15 Uber 
Belgium BVBA v Taxi Radio Bruxellois NV ECLI:EU:C:2016:830; and Case C-320/16 
Criminal proceedings against Uber France SAS, nyr.  
6 Research group on the Law of Digital Services, 'Discussion Draft of a Directive on 
Online Intermediary Platforms' (2016) 5(4) Journal of European Consumer and 
Market Law 164.  
7 Proposta di legge 'Disciplina delle piattaforme digitali per la condivisione di beni e 
servizi e disposizioni per la promozione dell'economia della condivisione', 27 January 
2016 http://www.camera.it/leg17/126?tab=2&leg=17&idDocumento=3564&sede=&tip
o= accessed 7 March 2017.  
8 Examples can be found in: Amsterdam’s Action Plan for the Sharing Economy 
(Actieplan Deeleconomie) http://www.sharenl.nl/nieuws/2016/03/09/actieplan-
deeleconomie accessed 6 March 2017, and the current process by the Catalan 
Government to review sector-specific legislation to adapt it to the sharing economy 
and the new sharing economy business models http://premsa.gencat.cat/ 
pres_fsvp/AppJava/notapremsavw/291907/ca/govern-revisara-normativa-sectorial-
actualitzar-regular-leconomia-collaborativa.do accessed 6 March 2017.  
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In the EU, since the initial call for more intrusive regulation9 characterised 
by the investigation of Amazon's e-book businesses, Google's advertising 
practices, and Facebook's privacy, the EU's regulatory approach has changed 
dramatically. For the time being, the European Union is embracing a more 
flexible and market-based regulatory approach. The European Commission, 
as part of the Digital Agenda for Europe, has published a Communication on 
Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market.10 The Commission suggests 
the creation of a regulatory model to accommodate the characteristics of the 
Platform Economy, in particular when it comes to the provision of services 
by persons who do not fall under the scope of the existing EU consumer 
protection legislation – online platforms are multisided markets.11 Moreover, 
the Commission's proposal: 1) does not propose a new general law on online 
platforms; 2) advances the partial deregulation of traditional communication 
services by establishing a level playing field for comparable digital services; 
and 3) and relies on self-regulation. Other regions across the world have not 
yet delivered any comprehensive regulatory solution.12 
Legal scholars are also aware of the challenges posed by digital technologies 
as to how to effectively regulate them.13 The Platform Economy calls for a 
                                                 
9 Günther Oettinger's (European Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society) 
Speech at Hannover Messe: 'Europe's Future is Digital', April 2015 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/oettinger/announcements/speech-
hannover-messe-europes-future-digital_en.  
10 European Commission, 'A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy' 
httpps://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-356-EN-F1-
1.PDF, 4: '(…) a more flexible regulation of services markets would lead to higher 
productivity and could ease the market entry of new players, reduce the price for 
services, and ensure wider choices for consumers'.  
11 European Commission, 'Communication on Online Platforms and the Digital Single 
Market Opportunities and Challenges for Europe' COM (2016) 288 final 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-singlemarket/en/news/communication-online-
platforms-and-digitalsingle-market-opportunities-and-challenges-europe accessed 
on 20 November 2016.  
12 See GSMA Mobile Economy Report (2016) http://www.gsma.com 
/mobileeconomy.  
13 A. Murray, The Regulation of Cyberspace: Control in the Online Environment (Routledge-
Cavendish 2006); C. Reed, Making Laws for Cyberspace (OUP 2012); R. Brownsword 
and K. Yeung (eds), Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (OUP 2008); R. 
Brownsword and M. Goodwin, Law and the Technologies of the Twenty-First Century 
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new generation of regulation (Regulation 2.0) based on information 
transparency and data-driven accountability.14 Against this background, 
while some claim that the Platform Economy requires a dedicated regulatory 
framework,15 some others advocate for the advantages of self-regulation as a 
tool to attract innovative – and profitable – new businesses.16 Lastly, a third 
alternative proposes the creation of a dedicated regulatory framework 
defining the 'essential requirements'17 in combination with the creation of a 
harmonised standard establishing the technical and legal details.18 
In the meantime, the existing legal concepts and categories devised for the 
analogue world are struggling to fit the brave new digital world of online 
platforms. In view of this, self-regulation and reputational mechanisms stand 
as suitable mechanisms for regulating the new types of transactions 
facilitated by online platforms. The main argument is the emergence of a new 
governance framework, which here is referred to as the spontaneous self-
regulation of digital platforms.19 This framework emerges bottom-up; from 
users' rating to standards of quality.  
                                                 
(CUP 2012); R. Brownsword, E. Scotford, and K. Yeung (eds), Oxford Handbook on 
Law, Regulation and Technology (OUP 2016); A. De Franceschi, European Contract Law 
and the Digital Single Market (Intersentia 2016); R. Schulze and D. Staudenmayer (eds), 
Digital Revolution: Challenges for Contract Law in Practice (Nomos 2016).  
14 N. Grossman, 'Regulation the Internet Way: a data-first model for establishing trust, 
safety and security. Regulatory Reform for the 21st Century City Project' 
http://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/white-paper-regulation-the-internet-
way-660 accessed 10 December 2016.  
15 See (n 6), and O, Lobel, 'The Law of the Platform' (2016) 16 Minnesota Law Review 
212. 
16 C. Koopman, M. Mitchell and A. Thierer, 'The Sharing Economy and Consumer 
Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change' (2015) 8(2) The Journal of 
Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law; M. Cohen and A. Sundararajan, 'Self 
Regulation and innovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy' (2015) 82 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. Dialogue 116. 
17 Research group on the Law of Digital Services, see (n 6).  
18 C. Busch, 'Crowdsourcing Consumer Confidence: How to Regulate Online Rating 
and Review Systems in the Collaborative Economy', in De Franceschi (n 13). 
19 Based on the concept of 'spontaneous governance' in O. Williamson, 'Economic 
Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance' (1991) 7 Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization 159.  
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III. REGULATORY OPT-OUT: TRUST AND REPUTATION  
AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO STATUTORY RULES 
The disruption of the Platform Economy facilitated by technological 
progress has come hand in hand with a societal transformation.20 In legal 
terms, one may even dare to speak about the emergence of a post-regulatory 
society. Participants in the Platform Economy feel more and more 
comfortable with transacting outside conventional legal and regulatory 
frameworks. Platform users find confidence not in the applicable rules, but 
mostly in the reputation of the other contracting party. In fact, platform 
businesses, in particular those belonging to the Sharing Economy, are largely 
designed around trust regimes and reputational ordering. 
A trust regime provides a scheme in which the enforcement of the contract 
is based on a secured credible commitment, as understood by North.21 Under 
such a regime, enforcement relies on a system of reputational feedback that 
builds on ratings and reputational quality, and where traders long to be 
esteemed.22 Such a system of quality compliance is largely generated 
spontaneously by users' feedback, giving rise to standards of quality. It is, 
therefore, a process of peer review that ensures the compliance with 
minimum quality requirements. Under this system, standards would act as 
'private judges', as understood by Williamson.23 They will make the 
reputation system 'more effective as a mean of promoting trade (…). [T]he 
system is designed to promote private resolution of disputes and otherwise 
to transmit just enough information to the right people in the right 
                                                 
20 P. Mason, Postcapitalism: A Guide to Our Future (Macmillan 2016); C. Anderson, The 
Long Tail: Why the Future of Business is Selling Less of More (Hachette Books 2006) and 
The Longer Long Tail (Random House Business 2009).  
21 D. C. North, 'Institutions and Credible Commitment' Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, (1993) 
11. 
22 See in this point Ch. III of Section ('Of the effects of prosperity and adversity upon 
the judgment of mankind…') within Part I ('On the prosperity of action') in A. Smith, 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments. (first published 1759, Penguin 2010).  
23 See (n 19).  
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circumstances to enable the reputation mechanism to function effectively for 
enforcement'.24 
This is an illustration of the opportunistic conditions favoured by the 
network effects inherent to the Platform Economy. In terms of game theory, 
reputational mechanisms together with the role of platform businesses as 
gatekeepers of large markets would explain the collective behavioural 
patterns observed among platform users. A cooperative behaviour will be 
preferred over non-cooperation, provided that cooperation preserves market 
access conditions whereas non-cooperation excludes them.25 Against this 
background, platform businesses are currently leading a (spontaneous) 
process of regulatory innovation in response to the ongoing economic, 
technological and societal transformations. These regulatory and 
institutional innovations represent a market response to the demands for 
regulation of the society in the Digital Age, which conventional forms of 
regulation and enforcement (judicial and extrajudicial) cannot easily 
replicate. 
Using services provided in the context of the Sharing Economy means 
opting-out from regulation.26 This leads to a process of de-regulation and, 
ultimately, to re-regulation, based on self-regulation. Such process entails far-
reaching implications for conventional regulatory theory. Thus, it is 
therefore necessary to rethink the nature and the role of these emerging 'post 
regulatory' norms and processes. 
Opting-out from regulation, i.e. the adoption of a self-regulatory approach 
based on community-created rules and practices, has already proved to be a 
successful strategy for certain sectors.27 Nevertheless, some scholars are 
                                                 
24 P. R. Milgrom and D. C. North, 'The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: 
The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs' Economics & Politics 
(1990) 2(1) 1. 
25 G.-P. Callies and M. Renner, 'Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of 
Global Governance' Ratio Juris (2009) 2(2) 260.  
26 Cf. L. Bernstein, 'Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations 
in the Diamond Industry' (1992) 21(1) The Journal of Legal Studies 115, 57. 
27 ibid, see also L. Bernstein, 'Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions' (2001) U Chicago Law & 
Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 133. 
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reluctant to the use of reputation mechanisms as a total replacement of 
regulation.28 Against this background, international standardisation stands as 
an alternative regulatory back-up solution devised for problems of 
institutional design; e.g. reputation mechanisms can be vulnerable to bias and 
abuse. The creation of international standards establishing procedural 
guarantees stands as a solution to design problems posed by reputational 
frameworks. In the field of online reputation, the International Standards 
Organization (ISO) has already initiated the works on standardisation of 
online reputation. The aim of the standard is to standardise methods, tools, 
processes, measures and best practices related to the online reputation of 
organisations or individuals providing services or products, derived from 
user-generated content (ISO/TC 290 – Online reputation).29  
In terms of transnational governance, the new technological environment 
has changed the rules of the game and it is giving rise to new modes of power, 
governance and ownership.30 Participation is now networked and peer 
driven.31 This has entailed a transformation in transnational governance, 
where standardisation is placed at the 'core of the emerging Transnational 
New Governance system'.32 The self-regulatory practices of standards, codes 
of conducts or best practices function as drivers of decentralisation of 
regulation.33 In the case of the Platform Economy, where the markets are 
instead being de-regulated,34 this paper adds that the development of digital 
                                                 
28 Busch (n 18).  
29 The creation of this global standard is based on the model developed by the French 
Association for Standardisation, AFNOR, in 2013. AFNOR, French Standard NF Z 
74-501 – Avis en ligne de consommateurs – Principes et exigences portant sur les processus de 
collecte, modération et restitution des avis en ligne de consommateurs (19 July 2013). 
30 M. Naím, The End of Power: from boardrooms to battlefields and churches to states, why 
being in charge isn't what it used to be (Basic Books 2014). 
31 J. Heimans and H. Timms, 'Understanding "New Power"' (2016) 92(12) Harvard 
Business Review 15. 
32 K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, 'International Regulation Without International 
Government: Improving IO Performance Through Orchestration', (2010) 5(3) The 
Review of International Organizations 315,44. 
33 J. Black, 'Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-
Regulation in a 'Post-Regulatory' World' (2001) 54(1) Current legal problems 103. 
34 B. Edelman and D. Geradin, 'Spontaneous Deregulation' (2016) 94(4) Harvard 
Business Review 80. 
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platforms constitutes a process of decentralisation not only of regulation, but 
also of de-regulation. Therefore, this spontaneous self-regulation serves as a 
proxy for new forms of transnational governance.35 Preliminary research 
conducted so far, suggests that spontaneous self-regulatory solutions based 
on the 'network communitarianism governance' model36 are responses to the 
challenges of regulatory legitimacy, effectiveness and connection.37 However, 
it remains to be seen to what extent platforms exert control over the flow of 
information within the platform to assess whether they are effectively 
channelling 'collective action' and setting new quality standards based on 
users' expectations, paying attention to the deficiencies encountered by 
Sunstein in his Republic.com.38 
IV. REPUTATIONAL ENFORCEMENT BASED ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
AND CONTRACT GOVERNANCE 
Law enforcement is experiencing a process of transformation,39 which is 
challenging the understanding not only of 'justice' but also the concept 'law' 
itself. This narrative is amplified with the introduction of digital technologies 
in conflict management. In order to overcome the legitimacy and procedural 
challenges posed by Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) mechanisms, at least 
in Europe, these procedures have been equipped with a combination of ex-
ante (certification) and ex-post (monitoring) procedural guarantees.40 Much 
                                                 
35 N. Elkin-Koren and E. Haber, 'Governance by Proxy' (2016) 82(1) Brooklyn Law 
Review 105.  
36 A. Murray, 'Nodes and Gravity in Virtual Space' (2011) 5(2) Legisprudence 195. 
37 As identified in Brownsword (n 13). 
38 C. R. Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton University Press 2001), and Republic.com 2.0 
(Princeton University Press 2009).  
39 H.-W. Micklitz and A. Wechsler (eds), The Transformation of Enforcement: European 
Economic Law in a Global Perspective (Hart Publishing 2016). See also Micklitz ‘The 
Transformation of Enforcement in European Private Law: Preliminary 
Considerations', (2015) 23(4) European Review of Private Law 491. 
40 Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes [2013] OJ L 165/1 and 
Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 
on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes [2013] OJ 165/63.  
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has been written about how an effectively designed ODR mechanism 
contributes to placing trust in the market.41 
Here, attention is paid to the potential of online platforms which offer 
embedded mechanisms for dispute resolution, for the development of a new 
mechanism of law enforcement. The primary aim of these platforms is not to 
offer a successful ODR model, but rather to provide a venue for dispute 
resolution as an organic complement to the transactions taking place via the 
platform. These 'integrated' venues for dispute resolution stand as a 
mechanism of enforcement separated not only from judicial enforcement but 
also from more generic manifestations of extrajudicial settlement. In this 
regard, where accessibility, speed, affordability and the existence of 
attractive remedies42 is a strong asset in the platforms' dispute resolution 
mechanism, platforms can effectively compete against the State-provided 
enforcement structure. In view of that, it is perhaps of major significance to 
ask why, while 40% EU traders do not even know about the existence of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms,43 eBay handles 60 million cases 
per year.44 Probably the answer to this pressing question lies in the 
institutional (and contractual) design of the embedded dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Moreover, the lack of effective incentives for traders to engage 
in ODR procedures like the EU ODR Platform45 has resulted in the 
automatic closing of 55% of the total submitted complaints because traders 
have not responded. Against this background, an enquiry is to be made 
                                                 
41 E. Katsh and J. Rifkin, Online Dispute Resolution: Resolving Conflicts in Cyberspace (John 
Wiley & Sons 2001); P. Cortés, Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in the European 
Union (Taylor & Francis, 2011); J. Hörnle, Cross-Border Internet Dispute Resolution 
(Cambridge University Press 2009); G. Kaufmann-Kohler and T. Schultz, Online 
Dispute Resolution: Challenges for Contemporary Justice (Kluwer Law International 
2004), to mention a few.  
42 Callies and Renner (n 25).  
43 European Commission, 'Settling consumer disputes online' Factsheet, January 2016.  
44 UK Civil Justice Council, 'Online Dispute Resolution for Law Value Civil Claims' 
(Online Dispute Resolution Advisory Group) 2015 https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Online-Dispute-Resolution-Final-Web-Version1.pdf 
accessed 10 December 2016.  
45 EU Online Dispute Resolution Platform https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/odr/main/? 
event=main.home.show accessed 10 December 2016.  
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concerning the extent to which online platforms might be contributing to 
bridging this 'ODR trust gap'.  
The incorporation of dispute resolution within the intermediary platform 
may create a de facto monopoly over enforcement. On the one hand, especially 
when it comes to small claims, chargeback mechanisms may serve as an 
effective remedy without having to rely on the support of state courts or 
private authorities.46  
On the other hand, by making participation in dispute resolution part of their 
terms and conditions, online platforms are offering effective incentives for 
traders to engage in the resolution of disputes. In so doing, the platform is 
acting as a gatekeeper of the market, provided that the trader wishes to remain 
trading via the platform as well as to improve, or at least to maintain, its 
reputational record. Thus, by providing a 'designed for trust' environment, 
online platforms are putting in place a mechanism of enforcement by 
exclusion. A non-collaborative behaviour in the event of a dispute may entail 
the exclusion of the platform by the removal of the listing or the cancellation 
of the registration; a consequence that may be exponentially amplified as a 
result of network effects. Moreover, some online platforms also display 
features of a governance by self-commitment and unilateral standard-setting, 
which set out the conditions for market access.47  
In this way, digital platforms can be seen as an illustration of cooperative 
regulation based on self-organisation and self-commitment, whereas the 
contract design of digital platforms offers a paradigmatic example of one of 
the manifestations of contract governance; governance through contract.48 
                                                 
46 P. Ortolani, 'Self-Enforcing Online Dispute Resolution: Lessons from Bitcoin' (2016) 
36(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 595.  
47 By way of example, Airbnb has included a Non-discrimination policy: 
https://es.airbnb.com 
/help/article/1405/airbnb-s-nondiscrimination-policy--our-commitment-to-
inclusion-and-respect, Responsible hosting guidance: https://es.airbnb.com/help/ 
article/1397/responsible-hosting, Hosting standards: https://es.airbnb.com/help/topi 
c/206/hosting-standards and a Code of conduct: https://openair.byairbnb.com 
/conduct.html.   
48 F. Möslein and K. Riesenhuber, 'Contract Governance – A draft research agenda' 
(2009) 5(3) European Review of Contract Law 248, 89. S. Grundmann, F. Möslein and 
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In view of this, contract governance offers a precise conceptual and analytical 
framework for developing the ideas associated with the emergence of 
platform businesses as rules-givers.  
Three important questions should be asked in relation to the role of platform 
businesses in dispute resolution: 1) whether platforms' innovations offer a 
more efficient venue – involving advantages in terms of speed and cost – to 
solving small disputes; 2) whether such advantages could be simulated by 
judicial redress and public forms of Alternative and Online Dispute 
Resolution (ADR, ODR) or other forms of adjudication; and ultimately 3) 
whether the advantages accompanying these embedded venues for dispute 
resolution are amounting to the displacement of enforcement from courts 
and administrative structures (hierarchies) to platforms (markets) against 
possible drawbacks or risks in terms of material justice. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper is concerned with the role of online platforms as a manifestation 
of decentralised regulatory innovation through private legal ordering by 
means of private contract and private dispute settlement. In particular, it 
puts the spotlight on the actual potential of reputational systems as a non-
legal source of normativity and capable of shaping (bottom-up) a regulatory 
regime outside established and conventional legal sources. Under these 
reputational regimes, ratings become a new benchmark for quality and can be 
used as parameters for dispute resolution, effectively replacing legal 
categories of rules and enforcement. This raises the question as to whether 
Regulation.com provides the enabling conditions for the development of an 
alternative normative order to State-provided norms.  
Regulation.com thus poses questions ranging from issues of institutional 
design and the role of reputational enforcement to the understanding of law 
and regulation. Given the size and social relevance of the Platform Economy, 
there is a clear demand for a multidisciplinary and transnational research 
agenda. The current state urges academics to reflect on how online platforms, 
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and especially those platforms belonging to the Sharing Economy, are not 
only disrupting the economy but its underlying structure.  
Further research is needed in order to examine the advantages and 
disadvantages of these emerging governance regimes vis-à-vis conventional 
forms of regulation. Attention is to be paid to the extent to which contract 
governance lays the foundation for these developments to take place, and 
how a contract governance framework based on reputational mechanisms 
and platforms' enforcement capabilities ultimately may serve as a proxy for 
transnational (and spontaneous) governance. Normatively, this provoking 
argument would challenge the application of analogue solutions to the digital 
realm by casting doubts on the creation and application of a formal regulatory 
framework as the most appropriate response to a trillion-dollar industry that 
has largely developed outside existing legislation.
